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Weak Informativity and the Information
in One Prior Relative to Another
Michael Evans and Gun Ho Jang
Abstract. A question of some interest is how to characterize the amount
of information that a prior puts into a statistical analysis. Rather than
a general characterization, we provide an approach to characterizing
the amount of information a prior puts into an analysis, when com-
pared to another base prior. The base prior is considered to be the
prior that best reflects the current available information. Our purpose
then is to characterize priors that can be used as conservative inputs
to an analysis relative to the base prior. The characterization that we
provide is in terms of a priori measures of prior-data conflict.
Key words and phrases: Weak informativity, prior-data conflict, in-
formation, noninformativity.
1. INTRODUCTION
Suppose we have two proper priors Π1 and Π2 on
a parameter space Θ for a statistical model {Pθ : θ ∈
Θ}. A natural question to ask is: how do we com-
pare the amount of information each of these priors
puts into the problem? While there may seem to be
natural intuitive ways to express this, such as prior
variances, it seems difficult to characterize this pre-
cisely in general. For example, the consideration of
several examples in Sections 3 and 4 makes it clear
that using the variance of the prior is not appropri-
ate for this task.
The motivation for this work comes from Gelman
(2006) and Gelman et al. (2008), where the intu-
itively satisfying notion of weakly informative priors
is introduced as a compromise between informative
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and noninformative priors. The basic idea is that we
have a base prior Π1, perhaps elicited, that we be-
lieve reflects our current information about θ, but
we choose to be conservative in our inferences and
select a prior Π2 that puts less information into the
analysis. While it is common to take Π2 to be a non-
informative prior, this can often produce difficulties
when Π2 is improper, and even when Π2 is proper,
it seems inappropriate, as it completely discards the
information we have about θ as expressed in Π1.
In addition, we may find that a prior-data conflict
exists with Π1 and so look for another prior that re-
flects at least some of the information that Π1 puts
into an analysis, but avoids the conflict.
We note that our discussion here is only about
how we should choose Π2 given that Π1 has already
been chosen. Of course, the choice of Π1 is of cen-
tral importance in a Bayesian analysis. Ideally, Π1
is chosen based on a clearly justified elicitation pro-
cess, but we know that this is often not the case.
In such a circumstance it makes sense to try and
choose Π1 reasonably but then be deliberately less
informative by choosing Π2 to be weakly informative
with respect to Π1. The point is to inspire confidence
that our analysis is not highly dependent on infor-
mation that may be unreliable. To do this, however,
requires a definition of what it means for one prior
to be weakly informative with respect to another
and that is what this paper is about.
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To implement the idea of weak informativity, we
need a precise definition. We provide this in Sec-
tion 2 and note that it involves the notion of prior-
data conflict. Intuitively, a prior-data conflict occurs
when the prior places the bulk of its mass where
the likelihood is relatively low, as the likelihood is
indicating that the true value of the parameter is
in the tails of the prior. Our definition of weak in-
formativity is then expressed by saying that Π2 is
weakly informative relative to Π1 whenever Π2 pro-
duces fewer prior-data conflicts a priori than Π1.
This leads to a quantifiable expression of weak in-
formativity that can be used to choose priors. In
Section 3 we consider this definition in the context
of several standard families of priors and it is seen
to produce results that are intuitively reasonable. In
Section 4 we consider applications of this concept
in some data analysis problems. While our intuition
about weak informativity is often borne out, we also
find that in certain situations we have to be careful
before calling a prior weakly informative.
First, however, we establish some notation and
then review how we check for prior-data conflict. We
suppose that Pθ(A) =
∫
A fθ(x)µ(dx), that is, each Pθ
is absolutely continuous with respect to a support
measure µ on the sample space X , with the den-
sity denoted by fθ. With this formulation a prior Π
leads to a prior predictive probability measure on X
given by M(A) =
∫
ΘPθ(A)Π(dθ) =
∫
Am(x)µ(dx),
wherem(x) =
∫
Θ fθ(x)Π(dθ). If T is a minimal suffi-
cient statistic for {Pθ : θ ∈Θ}, then it is well known
that the posterior is the same whether we observe x
or T (x). So we will denote the posterior by Π(·|T )
hereafter. Since T is minimal sufficient, we know
that the conditional distribution of x given T is in-
dependent of θ. We denote this conditional measure
by P (·|T ). The joint distribution Pθ × Π can then
be factored as
Pθ ×Π=M ×Π(·|x)
(1)
= P (·|T )×MT ×Π(·|T ),
where MT is the marginal prior predictive distribu-
tion of T .
While much of Bayesian analysis focuses on the
third factor in (1), there are also roles in a statistical
analysis for P (·|T ) and MT . As discussed in Evans
and Moshonov (2006, 2007), P (·|T ) is available for
checking the sampling model, for example, if x is
a surprising value from this distribution, then we
have evidence that the model {Pθ : θ ∈ Θ} is incor-
rect. Furthermore, it is argued that, if we conclude
that we have no evidence against the model, then
the factor MT is available for checking whether or
not there is any prior-data conflict, and we do this
by comparing the observed value of T (x) to MT . If
we have no evidence against the model, and no ev-
idence of prior-data conflict, then we can proceed
to inferences about θ. Actually, the issues involved
in model checking and checking for prior-data con-
flict are more involved than this (see, e.g., the cited
references and Section 5), but (1) gives the basic
idea that the full information, as expressed by the
joint distribution of (θ,x), splits into components,
each of which is available for a specific purpose in
a statistical analysis.
Accordingly, we restrict ourselves here, for any
discussions concerning prior-data conflict, to work-
ing withMT . One issue that needs to be addressed is
how one is to compare the observed value t0 = T (x0)
toMT . In essence, we need a measure of surprise and
for this we use a P -value. Effectively, we are in the
situation where we have a value from a single fixed
distribution and we need to specify the appropri-
ate P -value to use. In Evans and Moshonov (2006,
2007) the P -value for checking for prior-data conflict
is given by
MT (mT (t)≤mT (t0)),(2)
where mT is the density of MT with respect to the
volume measure on the range space for T . In Evans
and Jang (2011) it is proved that, for many of the
models and priors used in statistical analyses, (2)
converges almost surely, as the amount of data in-
creases, to Π(π(θ) ≤ π(θ∗)), where θ∗ is the true
value of θ. So (2) is assessing to what extent the true
value is in the tails of the prior, or, equivalently, to
what extent the prior information is in conflict with
how the data is being generated.
A difficulty with (2) is that it is not generally in-
variant to the choice of the minimal sufficient statis-
tic T . A general invariant P -value is developed in
Evans and Jang (2010) for situations where we want
to compare the observed value of a statistic to a fixed
distribution. This requires that the model and T
satisfy some regularity conditions, for example, all
spaces need to be locally Euclidean, support mea-
sures are given by volume measures on these spaces,
and T needs to be sufficiently smooth. A formal de-
scription of these conditions can be found in Tjur
(1974) and it is noted that these hold for the typical
statistical application. For example, these conditions
are immediately satisfied in the discrete case. Fur-
thermore, for continuous situations, with densities
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defined as limits, we get the usual expressions for
densities. When applied to checking for prior-data
conflict, this leads to using the invariant P -value
MT (m
∗
T (t)≤m∗T (t0)),(3)
where m∗T (t) =
∫
T−1tm(x)µT−1{t}(dx) = mT (t) ·
E(J−1T (x)|T (x) = t), µT−1{t} is the volume measure
on T−1{t}, JT (x) = (det(dT (x) ◦ dT ′(x)))−1/2 and
dT is the differential of T . Note that JT (x) gives the
volume distortion produced by T at x. So m∗T is the
density of MT with respect to the support measure
given by {E(J−1T (x)|T (x) = t)}−1 times the volume
measure on the range space for T .
In applications all models are effectively discrete,
as we measure responses to some finite accuracy, and
continuous models are viewed as being approxima-
tions. The use of (3), rather than (2), then expresses
the fact that we do not want volume distortions in-
duced by a transformation to affect our inferences.
So we allocate this effect of the transformation with
the support measure, rather than with the density,
when computing the P -value. In the discrete case,
as well as when T is linear, (2) and (3) give the same
value and otherwise seem to give very similar values.
Convergence of (3), to an invariant P -value based on
the prior, is established in Evans and Jang (2011).
We use (3) throughout this paper but note that it
is only in Section 3.3 where (3) differs from (2).
Our discussion here is based on a minimal suf-
ficient statistic T . We note that, except in math-
ematically pathological situations, such a statistic
exists. It may be, however, that T is high dimen-
sional, for example, T can be of the same dimension
as the data. In such situations the dimensionality
of the problem can often be reduced by examining
components of the prior in a hierarchical fashion.
For example, when the prior on θ = (θ1, θ2) is spec-
ified as π(θ) = π2(θ2|θ1)π1(θ1), then π1 and π2(·|θ1)
are checked separately and so the definition of weak
informativity applies to each component separately.
This is exemplified by the regression example of Sec-
tion 4.2 where θ = (θ1, θ2) = (β,σ
2). More on check-
ing the components of a prior can be found in Evans
and Moshonov (2006). Furthermore, when ancillar-
ies exist, it is necessary to condition on these when
checking for prior-data conflict, as this variation has
nothing to do with the prior. This results in a reduc-
tion of the dimension of the problem. The relevance
of ancillarity to the problem of weakly informative
priors is discussed in Section 5.
When choosing a prior it makes sense to consider
the prior distribution of more than just the minimal
sufficient statistic. For example, Chib and Ergashev
(2009) consider the prior distribution of a some-
what complicated function of the parameters and
data that has a real world interpretation. If this dis-
tribution produces values that seem reasonable in
light of what is known, then this goes some distance
toward justifying the prior. Also, the level of infor-
mativity of the prior can be judged by looking at the
prior distribution of this quantity when that is pos-
sible. While this is certainly a reasonable approach
to choosing Π1, it does not supply us with a defini-
tion of weak informativity. For example, a prior Π1
can be chosen as discussed in Chib and Ergashev
(2009), but then Π2 could be chosen to be weakly
informative with respect to Π1, to inspire confidence
that conclusions drawn are not highly dependent on
subjective appraisals.
As we will show, there will typically be many pri-
ors Π2 that are weakly informative with respect to
a given base prior Π1. The question then arises as to
which Π2 we should use. This is partially answered
in Section 2 where we show that the definition of
weak informativity leads to a quantification of how
much less informative Π2 is than Π1. For example,
we can choose Π2 in a family of priors to be 50%
less informative than Π1. Still, there may be many
such Π2 and at this time we do not have a criterion
that allows us to distinguish among such priors. For
example, suppose the base prior is a normal prior
for a location parameter. We can derive weakly in-
formative priors with respect to such a prior in the
family of normal priors (see Section 3.1) or in the
family of t priors (see Section 3.2). There is nothing
in our developments that suggests that a weakly in-
formative t prior is to be preferred to a weakly infor-
mative normal prior or conversely. Such distinctions
will have to be made based on other criteria.
2. COMPARING PRIORS
There are a variety of measures of information used
in statistics. Several measures have been based on the
concept of entropy, for example, see Lindley (1956)
and Bernardo (1979). While these measures have
their virtues, we note that their coding theory inter-
pretations can seem somewhat abstract in statisti-
cal contexts and they can suffer from nonexistence in
certain problems. Also, Kass and Wasserman (1995)
contain some discussion concerned with expressing
4 M. EVANS AND G. H. JANG
the absolute information content of a prior in terms
of additional sample values. Rather than adopting
these approaches, we consider comparing priors ba-
sed on their tendencies to produce prior-data con-
flicts. This formulation of the relative amount of in-
formation put into an analysis has a direct interpre-
tation in terms of statistical consequences.
Suppose that an analyst has in mind a prior Π1
that they believe represents the information at hand
concerning θ. The analyst, however, prefers to use
a prior Π2 that is conservative, when compared to Π1.
In such a situation it seems reasonable to consider Π1
as a base prior and then compare all other priors to
it. This idea comes from Gelman (2006) and leads
to the notion of weakly informative priors.
Before we observe data we have no way of know-
ing if we will have a prior-data conflict. Accordingly,
since the analyst has determined that Π1 best re-
flects the available information, it is reasonable to
consider the prior distribution of P1(t0) =
M1T (m
∗
1T (t)≤m∗1T (t0)) when t0 ∼M1T . Of course,
this is effectively uniformly distributed [exactly so
when m∗1T (t) has a continuous distribution when
t ∼M1T ] and this expresses the fact that all the
information about assessing whether or not a prior-
data conflict exists is contained in the P -value, with
no need to compare the P -value to its distribution.
Consider now, however, the distribution of P2(t0)=
M2T (m
∗
2T (t)≤m∗2T (t0)) which is used to check whe-
ther or not there is prior-data conflict with respect
to Π2. Given that we have identified that a priori the
appropriate distribution of t0 is M1T , at least for in-
ferences about an unobserved value, then P2(t0) is
not uniformly distributed. In fact, from the distribu-
tion of P2(t0) we can obtain an intuitively reasonable
idea of what it means for a prior Π2 to be weakly
informative relative to Π1. Suppose that the prior
distribution of P2(t0) clusters around 1. This im-
plies that, if we were to use Π2 as the prior when Π1
is appropriate, then there is a small prior probabil-
ity that a prior-data conflict would arise. Similarly,
if the prior distribution of P2(t0) clusters around 0,
then there is a large prior probability that a prior-
data conflict would arise. If one prior distribution
results in a larger prior probability of there being
a prior-data conflict than another, then it seems rea-
sonable to say that the first prior is more informative
than the second. In fact, a completely noninforma-
tive prior should never produce prior-data conflicts.
So we compare the distribution of P2(t0) when
t0 ∼M1T , to the distribution of P1(t0) when t0 ∼
M1T , and do this in a way that is relevant to the
prior probability of obtaining a prior-data conflict.
One approach to this comparison is to select a γ-
quantile xγ ∈ [0,1] of the distribution of P1(t0), and
then compute the probability
M1T (P2(t0)≤ xγ).(4)
The value γ is presumably some cutoff, dependent
on the application, where we will consider that evi-
dence of a prior-data conflict exists whenever
P1(t0) ≤ γ. Of course, if m∗1T (t0) has a continuous
distribution when t0 ∼M1T , then xγ = γ. Our basic
criterion for the weak informativity of Π2 relative
to Π1 will then be that (4) is less than or equal
to xγ . This implies that the prior probability of ob-
taining a prior-data conflict under Π2 is no greater
than when Π1 is used, at least when we have iden-
tified Π1 as our correct prior.
Definition 1. If (4) is less than or equal to xγ ,
then Π2 is weakly informative relative to Π1 at level γ.
If Π2 is weakly informative relative to Π1 at level γ
for every γ ≤ γ0, then Π2 is uniformly weakly infor-
mative relative to Π1 at level γ0. If Π2 is weakly in-
formative relative to Π1 at level γ for every γ, then Π2
is uniformly weakly informative relative to Π1.
Typically we would like to choose a prior Π2 that
is uniformly weakly informative with respect to Π1.
This still requires us to select a prior from this class,
however, and for this we must choose a level γ.
Once we have selected γ, the degree of weak infor-
mativity of a prior Π2 relative to Π1 can be assessed
by comparing M1T (P2(t0)≤ xγ) to xγ via the ratio
1−M1T (P2(t0)≤ xγ)/xγ .(5)
If Π2 is weakly informative relative to Π1 at level γ,
then (5) tells us the proportion of fewer prior-data
conflicts we can expect a priori when using Π2 rather
than Π1. Thus, (5) provides a measure of how much
less informative Π2 is than Π1 at level γ. So, for ex-
ample, we might ask for a prior Π2 that is uniformly
weakly informative with respect to Π1 and then,
for a particular γ, select a prior in this class such
that (5) equals 50%.
As we will see in the examples, it makes sense to
talk of one prior being asymptotically weakly infor-
mative at level γ with respect to another prior in the
sense that (4) is bounded above by γ in the limit as
the amount of data increases. In several cases this
simplifies matters considerably, as an asymptotically
weakly informative prior is easy to find and may still
be weakly informative for finite amounts of data.
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While (4) seems difficult to work with, the fol-
lowing result is proved in the Appendix and gives
a simpler expression.
Lemma 1. Suppose Pi(t) has a continuous dis-
tribution underMiT for i= 1,2. Then there exists rγ
such that M1T (P2(t)≤ γ) =M1T (m∗2T (t)≤ rγ), and
Π2 is weakly informative at level γ relative to Π1
whenever M1T (m
∗
2T (t) ≤ rγ) ≤ γ. Furthermore, Π2
is uniformly weakly informative relative to Π1 if and
only if M1T (m
∗
2T (t) ≤ m∗2T (t0)) ≤ M2T (m∗2T (t) ≤
m∗2T (t0)) for every t0.
Note that the equivalent condition for uniform
weak informativity in Lemma 1 says that the prob-
ability content, under M1T , in the “tails” (regions
of low density) of the densitym∗2T is always bounded
above by the probability content underM2T . SoM2T
puts more probability content into these tails than
M1T and this can be taken as an indication thatM2T
is more dispersed than M1T . Lemma 1 typically ap-
plies when we are dealing with continuous distribu-
tions on X . It can also be shown that Pi(t) has a con-
tinuous distribution underMiT if and only if m
∗
iT (t)
has a continuous distribution under MiT .
3. DERIVING WEAKLY INFORMATIVE
PRIORS
We consider several examples of families of priors
that arise in applications. These examples support
our definition of weak informativity and also lead
to some insights into choosing priors. The results
obtained for the examples in this section are com-
bined in Section 4.2 to give results for a practically
meaningful context.
We first note that, while we could consider com-
paring arbitrary priors Π2 to Π1, we want Π2 to
reflect at least some of the information expressed
in Π1. The simplest expression of this is to require
that Π2 have the same, or nearly the same, location
as Π1. This restriction simplifies the analysis and
seems natural.
3.1 Comparing Normal Priors
Suppose we have a sample x = (x1, . . . , xn) from
a N(µ,1) distribution where µ is unknown. Then t=
T (x) = x¯∼N(µ,1/n) is minimal sufficient and sin-
ce T is linear, there is constant volume distortion
and so this can be ignored. Suppose that the prior Π1
on µ is a N(µ0, σ
2
1) distribution with µ0 and σ
2
1
known. We then have that M1T is the N(µ0,1/n+
σ21) distribution. Now suppose that Π2 is a N(µ0, σ
2
2)
distribution with σ22 known. Then M2T is the N(µ0,
1/n+ σ22) distribution and
P2(t0) =M2T (m
∗
2T (t)≤m∗2T (t0))
=M2T (m2T (t)≤m2T (t0))
=M2T ((t− µ0)2 ≥ (t0 − µ0)2)
= 1−G1((t0 − µ0)2/(1/n+ σ22)),
where Gk denotes the Chi-squared(k) distribution
function. Now under M1T we have that (t0 − µ0)2/
(1/n+ σ21)∼Chi-squared(1). Therefore,
M1T (P2(t0)≤ γ)
=M1T (1−G1((t0 − µ0)2/(1/n+ σ22))≤ γ)
(6)
=M1T
(
(t0 − µ0)2
1/n+ σ21
≥ 1/n+ σ
2
2
1/n+ σ21
G−11 (1− γ)
)
= 1−G1
(
1/n+ σ22
1/n+ σ21
G−11 (1− γ)
)
.
We see immediately that (6) will be less than γ if
and only if σ2 > σ1. In other words, Π2 will be uni-
formly weakly informative relative to Π1 if and only
if Π2 is more diffuse than Π1. Note thatM1T (P2(t0)≤
γ) converges to 0 as σ22 →∞ to reflect noninforma-
tivity. Also, as n→∞, then (6) increases to 1 −
G1((σ
2
2/σ
2
1)G
−1
1 (1 − γ)). So we could ignore n and
choose σ22 conservatively based on this limit, to ob-
tain an asymptotically uniformly weakly informative
prior, as we know this value of σ22 will also be weakly
informative for finite n.
If we specify that we want (5) to equal p ∈ [0,1],
then (6) implies that σ22 = (1/n+ σ
2
1)(G
−1
1 (1− γ +
pγ)/G−11 (1−γ))−1/n. Such a choice will give a pro-
portion p fewer prior-data conflicts at level γ than
the base prior. This decreases to σ21G
−1
1 (1 − γ +
pγ)/G−11 (1 − γ) as n→∞ and so the more data
we have the less extra variance we need for Π2 for
weak informativity.
We can generalize this to t∼Nk(µ,n−1I) with Πi
given by µ∼Nk(µ0,Σi). Note we have that MiT is
the Nk(µ0, n
−1I+Σi) distribution. It is then easy to
see that P2(t0) = 1−Gk((t0−µ0)′(n−1I+Σ2)−1(t0−
µ0)) and
M1T (P2(t0)≤ γ)
=M1T ((t0 − µ0)′(n−1I +Σ2)−1(t0 − µ0)(7)
≥G−1k (1− γ)).
Note that (7) increases to the probability that (t0−
µ0)
′Σ2
−1(t0−µ0)≥G−1k (1−γ), when t0 ∼Nk(µ0,Σ1),
as n→∞. This probability can be easily computed
via simulation.
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The following result is proved in the Appendix.
Theorem 1. For a sample of n from the statis-
tical model {Nk(µ, I) :µ ∈Rk}, a Nk(µ0,Σ2) prior is
uniformly weakly informative relative to a Nk(µ0,Σ1)
prior if and only if Σ2−Σ1 is positive semidefinite.
The necessary part of Theorem 1 is much more dif-
ficult than the k = 1 case and shows that we cannot
have a Nk(µ0,Σ2) prior uniformly weakly informa-
tive relative to a Nk(µ0,Σ1) prior unless Σ2 ≥Σ1. It
follows from Theorem 1 that a Nk(µ0,Σ2) prior is
uniformly weakly informative relative to aNk(µ0,Σ1)
prior if and only if a N(atµ0, a
tΣ2a) prior is uni-
formly weakly informative relative to aN(atµ0, a
tΣ1a)
prior for every a ∈Rk.
For the choice of Σ2 we have that, if Σ1 and Σ2 are
arbitrary k×k positive definite matrices, then rΣ2 ≥
Σ1 whenever r ≥ λk(Σ1)/λ1(Σ2) where λi(Σ) deno-
tes the ith ordered eigenvalue of Σ. Note that this
condition does not require that the Σi have the same
eigenvectors. When they do have the same eigenvec-
tors, so Σi = QDiQ
′ is the spectral decomposition
of Σi, then Σ2 ≥ Σ1 whenever λi(Σ2) ≥ λi(Σ1) for
i= 1, . . . , k.
3.2 Comparing a t Prior with a Normal Prior
It is not uncommon to find t priors being sub-
stituted for normal priors on location parameters.
Suppose x= (x1, . . . , xn) is a sample from a N(µ,1)
distribution where µ is unknown. We take Π1 to be
a N(µ0, σ
2
1) distribution and Π2 to be a t1(µ0, σ
2
2 , λ)
distribution, that is, t1(µ0, σ
2
2 , λ) denotes the dis-
tribution of µ0 + σ2z with z distributed as a 1-di-
mensional t distribution with λ degrees of freedom.
We then want to determine σ22 and λ so that the
t1(µ0, σ
2
2, λ) prior is weakly informative relative to
the normal prior.
We consider first the limiting case as n→∞. The
limiting prior predictive distribution of the minimal
sufficient statistic T (x) = x¯ is N(µ0, σ
2
1) while P2(t0)
converges in distribution to 1−H1,λ((t0 − µ0)2/σ22)
where H1,λ is the distribution function of an F1,λ
distribution. This implies that (4) converges to 1−
G1((σ
2
2/σ
2
1)H
−1
1,λ(1−γ)) and this is less than or equal
to γ if and only if σ22/σ
2
1 ≥G−11 (1− γ)/H−11,λ(1− γ)).
So to have that Π2 is asymptotically weakly infor-
mative relative to Π1 at level γ, we must choose σ
2
2
large enough. Clearly we have that Π2 is asymptot-
ically uniformly weakly informative relative to Π1 if
and only if
σ22/σ
2
1 ≥K(λ) = sup
γ∈[0,1]
G−11 (1− γ)/H−11,λ(1− γ).
In Figure 1 we have plotted K(λ) against log(λ).
Fig. 1. Plot of K(λ) against log(λ) where a t1(µ0, σ
2
2 , λ)
prior is asymptotically uniformly weakly informative relative
to a N(µ0, σ
2
1) prior if and only if σ
2
2/σ
2
1 ≥K(λ).
Since K(1) = 0.6366, we require that σ22 ≥
σ21(0.6366) for a Cauchy prior to be uniformly weakly
informative with respect to a N(µ0, σ
2
1) prior.
A t1(µ0, σ
2
2 ,3) prior has variance 3σ
2
2 . If we choose σ
2
2
so that the variance is σ21 , then σ
2
2/σ
2
1 = 1/3. Since
this is less than K(3) = 0.8488, this prior is not
uniformly weakly informative. A t1(µ0, σ
2
2,3) prior
has to have variance at least equal to (2.5464)σ21 if
we want it to be uniformly weakly informative rela-
tive to a N(µ0, σ
2
1) prior. This is somewhat surpris-
ing and undoubtedly is caused by the peakedness of
the t distribution. Note that K(λ)→ 1 as λ→∞,
so this increase in variance, for the t prior over the
normal prior, decreases as we increase the degrees
of freedom.
The situation for finite n is covered by the follow-
ing result proved in the Appendix.
Theorem 2. For a sample of n from the statis-
tical model {N(µ,1) :µ ∈R1}, a t1(µ0, σ22, λ) prior is
uniformly weakly informative relative to a N1(µ0, σ
2
1)
prior whenever σ22 ≥ σ20n, where σ20n is the unique
solution of (1/n+ σ21)
−1/2 =
∫∞
0 (1/n+ σ
2
0n/u)
−1/2 ·
kλ(u)du with kλ the Gammarate(λ/2, λ/2) density.
Further, σ20n/σ
2
1 increases to
K(λ) = sup
γ∈[0,1]
G−11 (1− γ)
H−11,λ(1− γ)
=
2
λ
Γ2((λ+1)/2)
Γ2(λ/2)
(8)
as n→∞ and so a t1(µ0, σ22, λ) prior is asymptot-
ically uniformly weakly informative if and only if
σ22/σ
2
1 is greater than or equal to (8).
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Fig. 2. Plot of (4) versus γ for t1(0, σ
2
2 ,3) priors relative
to a N(0,1) prior when n= 20, where σ22 is chosen to match
variances (thick solid line), match the MAD (dashed line), just
achieve uniform weak informativity (dotted line), just achieve
asymptotic uniform weak informativity (dash-dot line), and
equal to 1 (long-dashed line).
Theorem 2 establishes that we can conservatively
use (8) to select a uniformly weakly informative t
prior.
In Figure 2 we have plotted the value of (4) that
arises with t1(0, σ
2
2 ,3) priors, where σ
2
2 is chosen in
a variety of ways, together with the 45-degree line.
A uniformly weakly informative prior will have (4)
always below the 45-degree line, while a uniformly
weakly informative prior at level γ0 will have (4)
below the 45-degree line to the left of γ0 and possibly
above to the right of γ0. For example, when σ
2
2 =
1/3, then the t1(0, σ
2
2 ,3) prior and the N(0,1) prior
have the same variance. We see that this prior is only
uniformly weakly informative at level γ0 = 0.0357
and is not uniformly weakly informative.
Note that (5) converges to 1−G1((σ22/σ21)H−11,λ(1−
γ))/γ as n→∞, and setting this equal to p implies
that σ22 = σ
2
1G
−1
1 (1−γ+γp)/H−11,λ(1−γ) which con-
verges, as λ→∞, to the result we obtained in Sec-
tion 3.1. So when λ = 3, γ = 0.05 and p = 0.5, we
must have σ22/σ
2
1 = 5.0239/10.1280 = 0.49604.
Our analysis indicates that one has to be careful
about the scaling of the t prior if we want to say that
the t prior is less informative than a normal prior,
at least when we want uniform weak informativity.
Consider now comparing a multivariate t prior to
a multivariate normal prior. Let tk(µ0,Σ2, λ) denote
the k-dimensional t distribution given by µ0+Σ
1/2
2 z,
where Σ
1/2
2 is a square root of the positive definite
matrix Σ2 and z has a k-dimensional t distribution
with λ degrees of freedom. This is somewhat more
complicated than the normal case, but we prove the
following result in the Appendix which provides suf-
ficient conditions for the asymptotic uniform weak
informativity.
Theorem 3. When sampling from the statisti-
cal model {Nk(µ, I) :µ ∈Rk}, a tk(µ0,Σ2, λ) prior is
asymptotically uniformly weakly informative relative
to a Nk(µ0,Σ1) prior whenever Σ2 − τ2λΣ1 is posi-
tive semidefinite, where τ2λ = (2/λ)Γ
2/k((k + λ)/2)/
Γ2/k(λ/2).
In contrast with Theorem 1, we do not have an
equivalent characterization of the uniform weak in-
formativity of multivariate t priors in terms of the
marginal priors of atµ. For example, when k = 2,
then τ2λ=1 and when k=1, then τ
2
λ=2Γ
2((λ+1)/2)/
λΓ2(λ/2)< 1 for all λ. Therefore, atΣ2a−{2Γ2((λ+
1)/2)/λΓ2(λ/2)}atΣ1a > 0 for all a does not imply
that Σ2 − Σ1 is positive semidefinite, for example,
take Σ2 =Σ1(1 + 2Γ
2((λ+ 1)/2)/λΓ2(λ/2))/2.
For the choice of Σ2 we have that, if Σ1 and Σ2
are arbitrary k × k positive definite matrices, then
rΣ2 ≥ τ2λΣ1 whenever r ≥ τ2λλk(Σ1)/λ1(Σ2). When
the Σi have the same eigenvectors, then Σ2 ≥ τ2λΣ1
whenever λi(Σ2)≥ τ2λλi(Σ1) for i= 1, . . . , k.
3.3 Comparing Inverse Gamma Priors
Suppose now that we have a sample x=(x1, . . . , xn)
from a N(0, σ2) distribution where σ2 is unknown.
Then t= T (x) = (x21 + · · ·+ x2n)/n is minimal suffi-
cient and T ∼Gammarate(n/2, n/2σ2). Now suppose
that we take Πi to be an inverse gamma prior on σ
2,
namely, σ−2 ∼Gammarate(αi, βi). From this we get
that αiT/βi ∼ F (n,2αi) and, since JT (x) = (4x′x/
n)−1/2 = (4t/n)−1/2,m∗iT,n(t) =miT,n(t) ·(4t/n)1/2 ∝
t(n−1)/2(1 + nt/2βi)
−n/2−αi , which implies
Pi,n(t0) =MiT,n(t
(n−1)/2(1 + nt/2βi)
−n/2−αi
≤ t(n−1)/20 (1 + nt0/2βi)−n/2−αi).
We want to investigate the weak informativity of
a Gammarate(α2, β2) prior relative to a Gammarate(α1,
β1) prior. For finite n this is a difficult problem, so
we simplify this by considering only the asymptotic
case. When the prior is Πi, then, as n→∞, we have
that miT,n(t) → miT (t) = (βαii /Γ(αi))t−αi−1e−βi/t,
that is, 1/t ∼ Gammarate(αi, βi) in the limit.
Therefore, P2,n(t0)→ P2(t0) = Π2(t−α2−1/2e−β2/t ≤
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Fig. 3. Plot of (α,β) corresponding to Beta(α,β) priors that are weakly informative at level γ = 0.05 (light and dark shading)
and uniformly weakly informative (light shading) for n= 20 (on the left), n= 100 (middle) and n=∞ (on the right).
t
−α2−1/2
0 · e−β2/t0) and we want to determine condi-
tions on (α2, β2) so that Π1(P2(t)≤ γ)≤ γ.
While results can be obtained for this problem, it
is still rather difficult. It is greatly simplified, how-
ever, if we impose a natural restriction on (α2, β2).
In particular, we want the location of the bulk of the
mass for Π2 to be located roughly in the same place
as the bulk of the mass for Π1. Accordingly, we could
require the priors to have the same means or modes,
but, as it turns out, the constraint that requires the
modes of the m∗iT functions to be the same greatly
simplifies the analysis. Actually, m∗iT,n(t) converges
to 0, but the n’s cancel in the inequalities defin-
ing Pi,n(t0) and so we can define m
∗
iT,n(t) =
t−αi−1/2e−βi/t which has its mode at t = βi/(αi +
1/2). Therefore, we must have β2/(α2 + 1/2) = β1/
(α1 + 1/2) so that (α2, β2) lies on the line through
the points (0, β1/2(α1+1/2)) and (α1, β1). We prove
the following result in the Appendix.
Theorem 4. Suppose we use a Gammarate(α1,
β1) prior on 1/σ
2 when sampling from the statistical
model {N(0, σ2) :σ2 > 0}. Then a Gammarate(α2, β2)
prior on 1/σ2, with β2/(α2 + 1/2) = β1/(α1 + 1/2),
is asymptotically weakly informative relative to the
Gammarate(α1, β1) prior whenever α2 ≤ α1 and β2 =
β1(α2 + 1/2)/(α1 + 1/2) or, equivalently, whenever
β1/2(α1+1/2)≤ β2 ≤ β1 and α2 = (α1+1/2)β2/β1−
1/2.
Of particular interest here is that we cannot re-
duce the rate parameter β2 arbitrarily close to 0 and
be guaranteed asymptotic weak informativity.
4. APPLICATIONS
We consider now some applications of determining
weakly informative priors.
4.1 Weakly Informative Beta Priors for the
Binomial
Suppose that T∼Binomial(n, θ) and θ∼Beta(α,β).
This implies thatmT (t) = (
n
t )Γ(α+β)Γ(t+α)Γ(n−
t+ β)/Γ(α)Γ(β)Γ(n + α+ β) and from this we can
compute (4) for various choices of (α,β).
As a specific example, suppose that n = 20, the
base prior is given by (α,β) = (6,6), and we take
γ = 0.05 so that x0.05 = 0.0588. As alternatives to
this base prior, we consider Beta(α,β) priors. In Fig-
ure 3 we have plotted all the (α,β) corresponding
to Beta(α,β) distributions that are weakly informa-
tive with respect to the Beta(6,6) distribution at
level 0.05, together with the subset of all (α,β) cor-
responding to Beta(α,β) distributions that are uni-
formly weakly informative relative to the Beta(6,6)
distribution. The graph on the left corresponds to
n = 20, the middle graph corresponds to n = 100,
and the graph on the right corresponds to n =∞.
The plot for n = 20 shows some anomalous effects
due to the discreteness of the prior predictive distri-
butions and these effects disappear as n increases.
In such an application we may choose to restrict
to symmetric priors, as this fixes the primary loca-
tion of the prior mass. For example, when n = 20,
a Beta(α,α) prior for α satisfying 1 ≤ α ≤ 12.3639
is uniformly weakly informative with respect to the
Beta(6,6) prior and we see that values of α > 6 are
eliminated as n increases.
4.2 Weakly Informative Priors for the Normal
Regression Model
Consider the situation where y ∼ Nn(Xβ,σ2I),
X ∈ Rn×k is of rank k and β ∈ Rk, σ2 > 0 are un-
known. Therefore, T = (b, s2) with b= (X ′X)−1X ′y
and s2 = ‖y−Xb‖2. Suppose we have elicited a prior
on (β,σ2) given by 1/σ2 ∼ Gammarate(α1, τ1), and
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β|σ2 ∼ Nk(β0, σ2Σ1). We now find a prior that is
asymptotically uniformly weakly informative rela-
tive to this choice. For this we consider gamma pri-
ors for 1/σ2 and t priors for β given σ2. For the
asymptotics we suppose that λk((X
′X)−1)→ 0 as
n→∞.
As discussed in Evans and Moshonov (2006, 2007),
it seems that the most sensible way to check for
prior-data conflict here is to first check the prior
on σ2, based on the prior predictive distribution
of s2. If no prior-data conflict is found at this stage,
then we check the prior on β based on the condi-
tional prior predictive for b given s2, as s2 is ancil-
lary for β. Such an approach provides more infor-
mation concerning where a prior-data conflict exists
than simply checking the whole prior via (3).
So we consider first obtaining an asymptotically
uniformly weakly informative prior for 1/σ2. We
have that s2|σ2 ∼Gammarate((n−k)/2, (n−k)/2σ2)
and so, as in Section 3.3, when 1/σ2 ∼Gammarate(αi,
τi), the limiting prior predictive distribution of 1/s
2
is Gammarate(αi, τi) as n→∞. Furthermore, when
T2(x) = s
2, then JT2(x) = (4s
2/(n− k))−1/2. There-
fore, the limiting value of (4) in this case is the same
as that discussed in Section 3.3 and Theorem 4 ap-
plies to obtain a Gammarate(α2, τ2) prior asymptot-
ically uniformly weakly informative relative to the
Gammarate(α1, τ1) prior.
If we consider s2 as an arbitrary fixed value from
its prior predictive distribution, then, when β|σ2 ∼
Nk(β0, σ
2Σ1), the conditional prior predictive distri-
bution of b given s2 converges to the Nk(β0, s
2Σ1)
distribution. Furthermore, when β|σ2 ∼ tk(β0, σ2Σ2,
λ), the conditional prior predictive distribution of b
given s2 converges to the tk(β0, s
2Σ2, λ) distribution.
So we can apply Lemma 1 to these limiting distribu-
tions. It is then clear that the comparison is covered
by Theorem 3, as the limiting prior predictives are of
the same form. Therefore, the tk(β0, σ
2Σ2, λ) prior
is asymptotically uniformly weakly informative rel-
ative to the Nk(β0, σ
2Σ1) prior whenever s
2Σ2 ≥
s2τ2λΣ1 or, equivalently, whenever Σ2≥τ2λΣ1 where τ2λ
is defined in Theorem 3. Note that this condition
does not depend on s2. Also, as λ→∞, we can use
Theorem 2 to obtain that a Nk(β0, σ
2Σ2) prior is
asymptotically uniformly weakly informative rela-
tive to the Nk(β0, σ
2Σ1) prior whenever Σ2 ≥Σ1.
4.3 Weakly Informative Priors for Logistic
Regression
Supposing we have a single binary valued response
variable Y and k quantitative predictors X1, . . . ,Xk,
Table 1
Dose (g/ml) Number of animals ni Number of deaths ti
0.422 5 0
0.744 5 1
0.948 5 3
2.069 5 5
we observe (Y,X1, . . . ,Xk) at q settings of the pre-
dictor variables and have ni observations at the ith
setting of the predictors. The logistic regression mo-
del then says that Yij ∼Bernoulli(pi) where log(pi/
(1 − pi)) = β0 + β1(xi1 − x¯·1) + · · · + βk(xik − x¯·k)
for j = 1, . . . , ni and i = 1, . . . , q and the βi are un-
known real values. For simplicity, we will assume no
xij− x¯·j is zero. For this model T = (T1, . . . , Tq), with
Ti = Yi1+ · · ·+Yini , is a minimal sufficient statistic.
For the base prior we suppose that Π1 is the product
of independent priors on the βi’s and we consider the
problem of finding a prior Π2 that is weakly informa-
tive relative to Π1. For example, we could take Π1 to
be a product of N(0, σ21i) priors and Π2 to be a prod-
uct of N(0, σ22i) priors and choose the σ
2
2i so that
weak informativity is obtained. Note that since T is
discrete we can use (2) in our computations.
As we will see, it is not the case that choosing
the σ22i very large relative to the σ
2
1i will necessarily
make Π2 weakly informative relative to Π1. In fact,
there is only a finite range of σ22i values where weak
informativity will obtain.
While this can be demonstrated analytically, the
argument is somewhat technical and it is perhaps
easier to see this in an example. The following bioas-
say data are from Racine et al. (1986) and were also
analyzed in Gelman et al. (2008). These data arise
from an experiment where 20 animals were exposed
to four doses of a toxin and the number of deaths
recorded (Table 1).
Following Gelman et al. (2008), we took X1 to
be the variable formed by calculating the logarithm
of dose and then standardizing to make the mean
of X1 equal to 0 and its standard deviation equal
to 1/2. Gelman et al. (2008) placed independent
Cauchy priors on the regression coefficients, namely,
β0 ∼ t1(0,102,1) independent of β1 ∼ t1(0,2.52,1).
We consider four possible scenarios for the in-
vestigation of weak informativity at level γ = 0.05
and uniform weak informativity. In Figure 4(a) we
compare Π2 = N(0, σ
2
0) × N(0, σ21) priors with the
prior Π1 =N(0,10
2)×N(0,2.52). The entire region
gives the (σ0, σ1) values corresponding to priors that
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(a) (b)
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Fig. 4. Weakly informative Π2 priors relative to Π1 at level 0.05 (light and dark shading) and uniformly weakly informative
(light shading) where ( a) Π1 =N(0,10
2)×N(0,2.52) and Π2 =N(0, σ
2
0)×N(0, σ
2
1), (b) Π1 = t1(0,10
2,1)× t1(0,2.5
2,1) and
Π2 = t1(0, σ
2
0 ,1)× t1(0, σ
2
1 ,1), ( c) Π1 =N(0,10
2)×N(0,2.52) and Π2 = t1(0, σ
2
0 ,1)× t1(0, σ
2
1 ,1) and (d) Π1 = t1(0,10
2,1)×
t1(0,2.5
2,1) and Π2 =N(0, σ
2
0)×N(0, σ
2
1).
are weakly informative at level γ = 0.05, while the
lighter subregion gives the (σ0, σ1) values correspond-
ing to priors that are uniformly weakly informative.
Note that some of the irregularity in the plots is
caused by the fact that the prior predictive distri-
butions of T are discrete. The three remaining plots
are similar where in Figure 4(b) Π1 = t1(0,10
2,1)×
t1(0,2.5
2,1) and Π2 = t1(0, σ
2
0 ,1)×t1(0, σ21 ,1), in Fig-
ure 4(c) Π1 =N(0,10
2)×N(0,2.52) and Π2 = t1(0,
σ20 ,1)×t1(0, σ21 ,1), and in Figure 4(d) Π1 = t1(0,102,
1)× t1(0,2.52,1) and Π2 =N(0, σ20)×N(0, σ21). Note
that these plots only depend on the data through the
values of X1.
We see clearly from these plots that increasing the
scaling on any of the βi does not necessarily lead to
weak informativity and in fact inevitably destroys
it. Furthermore, a smaller scaling on a parameter
can lead to uniform weak informativity. These plots
underscore how our intuition does not work very
well with the logistic regression model, as it is not
clear how priors on the βi ultimately translate to
priors on the pi. In fact, it can be proven that, if we
put independent priors on the βi, fix all the scalings
but one, and let that scaling grow arbitrarily large,
then the prior predictive distribution of T converges
to a distribution concentrated on two points, for ex-
WEAK INFORMATIVITY 11
Fig. 5. Reduction levels of N(0, σ20) × N(0, σ
2
1) relative to
N(0,102) × N(0,2.52) priors using (5) when γ = 0.05. The
plotted reduction levels are 0% (solid line), 25% (dashed line),
50% (dotted line) and 75% (long dashed line).
ample, when the scaling on β0 increases these points
are given by {∑qi=1 Ti = 0} ∪ {∑qi=1 Ti =∑qi=1 ni},
and this is definitely not desirable. This partially
explains the results obtained.
Of some interest is how much reduction we ac-
tually get, via (5), when we employ a weakly in-
formative prior. In Figure 5 we have plotted con-
tours of the choices of (σ0, σ1) that give 0%, 25%,
50% and 75% reduction in prior-data conflicts for
the case where Π2 =N(0, σ
2
0)×N(0, σ21) and Π1 =
N(0,102) × N(0,2.52) when γ = 0.05 (this corre-
sponds to xγ = 0.0503). Note that a substantial re-
duction can be obtained.
We can also consider fixing one of the scalings and
seeing how much reduction we obtain when varying
the other. For example, when we fix σ0 = 2.5 we find
that the maximum reduction is obtained when σ1 is
close to 2.2628, while if we fix σ1 = 2.5, then the
maximum reduction is obtained when σ0 is close
to 0.875.
It makes sense in any application to check to see
if any prior-data conflict exists with respect to the
base prior. If there is no prior-data conflict, this
increases our confidence that the weakly informa-
tive prior is indeed putting less information into
the analysis. This is assessed generally using (3),
although (2) suffices in this example. When Π1 =
N(0,102) × N(0,2.52), then (2) equals 0.1073 and
when Π1 = t1(0,10
2,1)× t1(0,2.52,1) (the prior used
in Gelman et al., 2008), then (2) equals 0.1130, so
in neither case is there any evidence of prior-data
conflict.
5. REFINEMENTS BASED UPON
ANCILLARITY
Consider an ancillary statistic that is a function of
the minimal sufficient statistic, say, U(T ). The vari-
ation due to U(T ) is independent of θ and so should
be removed from the P -value (3) when checking for
prior-data conflict. Removing this variation is equiv-
alent to conditioning on U(T ) and so we replace (3)
by
MT (m
∗
T (t)≤m∗T (t0)|U(T )),(9)
that is, we use the conditional prior predictive given
the ancillary U(T ). To remove the maximal amount
of ancillary variation, we must have that U(T ) is
a maximal ancillary. Therefore, (4) becomes
M1T (P2(t0|U(T ))≤ xγ |U(T )),(10)
that is, we have replaced P2(t0) by P2(t0|U(T )) =
M2T (m
∗
2T (t) ≤ m∗2T (t0)|U(T )) and M1T by
M1T (·|U(T )).
We note that the approach discussed in Section 2
works whenever T is a complete minimal sufficient
statistic. This is a consequence of Basu’s Theorem,
as, in such a case, any ancillary is statistically inde-
pendent of T and so conditioning on such an ancil-
lary is irrelevant. This is the case for the examples
in Sections 3 and 4.
One problem with ancillaries is that multiple max-
imal ancillaries may exist. When ancillaries are used
for frequentist inferences about θ via conditioning,
this poses a problem because it is not clear which
maximal ancillary to use and confidence regions de-
pend on the maximal ancillary chosen. For checking
for prior-data conflict via (9), however, this does not
pose a problem. This is because we simply get differ-
ent checks depending on which maximal ancillary we
condition on. For example, if conditioning on maxi-
mal ancillary U1(T ) does not lead to prior-data con-
flict, but conditioning on maximal ancillary U2(T )
does, then we have evidence against no prior-data
conflict existing.
Similarly, when we go to use (10), we can also
simply look at the effect of each maximal ancillary
on the analysis and make our assessment about Π2
based on this. For example, we can use the maxi-
mum value of (10) over all maximal ancillaries to
assess whether or not Π2 is weakly informative rel-
ative to Π1. When this maximum is small, we con-
clude that we have a small prior probability of find-
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Fig. 6. Plot of all (α,β) corresponding to Beta(α,β) priors
that are weakly informative at level γ = 0.05 (light and dark
shading) and uniformly weakly informative (light shading).
ing evidence against the null hypothesis of no prior-
data conflict when using Π2. We illustrate this via
an example.
Example 1. Suppose that we have a sample
of n from the Multinomial(1, (1−θ)/6, (1+θ)/6, (2−
θ)/6, (2 + θ)/6) distribution where θ ∈ [−1,1] is un-
known. Then the counts (f1, f2, f3, f4) constitute a mi-
nimal sufficient statistic and U1 = (f1 + f2, f3 + f4)
is ancillary, as is U2 = (f1 + f4, f2 + f3). Then T =
(f1, f2, f3, f4)|U1 is given by f1| U1 ∼ Binomial(f1+
f2, (1−θ)/2) independent of f3| U1 ∼ Binomial(f3+
f4, (2− θ)/4), giving
mT (f1, f2, f3, f4|U1)
=
(
f1 + f2
f1
)(
f3+ f4
f3
)
·
∫ 1
−1
(
1− θ
2
)f1(1 + θ
2
)f2(2− θ
4
)f3
·
(
2 + θ
4
)f4
π(θ)dθ.
We then have two 1-dimensional distributions f1|U1
and f3|U1 to use for checking for prior-data conflict.
A similar result holds for the conditional distribu-
tion given U2.
For example, suppose π is a Beta(20,20) distribu-
tion on [−1,1], so the prior concentrates about 0,
and for a sample of n= 18 we have that U1 = f1 +
f2 = 10 and U2 = f1 + f4 = 8. In Figure 6 we have
plotted all the values of (α,β) that correspond to
a Beta(α,β) prior that is weakly informative rela-
tive to the Beta(20,20) prior at level γ = 0.05, as
well as those that are uniformly weakly informative.
So for each such (α,β) we have that (10) is less than
or equal to 0.05 for both U =U1 and U = U2.
6. CONCLUSIONS
We have developed an approach to measuring the
amount of information a prior puts into a statisti-
cal analysis relative to another base prior. This base
prior can be considered as the prior that best re-
flects current information and our goal is to deter-
mine a prior that is weakly informative with respect
to it. Our measure is in terms of the prior predic-
tive probability, using the base prior, of obtaining
a prior-data conflict. This was applied in several
examples where the approach is seen to give intu-
itively reasonable results. The examples chosen here
focused on commonly used prior families. In several
cases these were conjugate families, although there
is no special advantage computationally to conju-
gacy in this context.
As noted in several examples, we need to be care-
ful when we conceive of a prior being weakly infor-
mative relative to another. Ultimately this concept
needs to be made precise and we feel our definition
is a reasonable proposal. The definition has intu-
itive support, in terms of avoiding prior-data con-
flicts, and provides a quantifiable criterion that can
be used to select priors.
In any application we should still check for prior-
data conflict for the base prior using (3). If prior-
data conflict is found, a substitute prior that is weak-
ly informative relative to the base prior can then
be selected and a check made for prior-data con-
flict with respect to the new prior. While selecting
the prior based on the observed data is not ideal,
this process at least seems defensible from a logical
perspective. For example, the new prior still incor-
porates some of the information from the base prior
and is not entirely driven by the data. Certainly, in
the end it seems preferable to base an analysis on
a prior for which a prior-data conflict does not exist.
Of course, we must still report the original conflict
and how this was resolved.
We have restricted our discussion here to proper
priors. The concept of weak informativity is obvi-
ously related to the idea of noninformativity and im-
proper priors. Certainly any prior that has a claim to
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being noninformative should not lead to prior-data
conflict. At this time, however, there is no precise
definition of what a noninformative prior is, whereas
we have provided a definition of a weakly informa-
tive prior. In the examples of Section 3.1 and 3.2 we
see that if the spread of Π2 is made large enough,
then Π2 is uniformly weakly informative with re-
spect to the base prior. This suggests that the flat
improper prior, which is Jeffreys’ prior for this prob-
lem, can be thought of as always being uniformly
weakly informative. The logistic regression example
of Section 4.3 suggests caution, however, in inter-
preting increased diffuseness as a characterization
of weak informativity. In the binomial example of
Section 4.1 the uniform prior is always weakly in-
formative with respect to the base prior, while the
Beta(1/2,1/2) (Jeffreys’) prior is not. Further work
is required for a full examination of the relationships
among the concepts of prior-data conflict, noninfor-
mativity and weak informativity.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. We have that xγ = γ since
P1(t) has a continuous distribution underM1T . Sup-
pose m∗iT (t) has a point mass at r0 when t∼MiT .
The assumption MiT (m
∗
iT (t) = r0) > 0 implies
(m∗iT )
−1{r0} 6= ∅. Then, pick tr0 ∈ (m∗iT )−1{r0} so
that m∗iT (tr0) = r0 and let ηi = Pi(tr0). Then, Pi(t)
has point mass at ηi because MiT (Pi(t) = ηi) ≥
MiT (m
∗
iT (t) = m
∗
iT (tr0)) = MiT (m
∗
iT (t) = r0) > 0.
This is a contradiction and so m∗iT (t) has a con-
tinuous distribution when t∼MiT .
Let rγ = sup{r ∈R :M2T (m∗2T (t)≤ r)≤ γ} where
R= {m∗2T (t) : t ∈ T } and T is the range space of T .
Then, M2T (m
∗
2T (t) ≤ rγ) = γ and M2T (m∗2T (t) ≤
rγ + ǫ) > γ for all ǫ > 0. Thus, we have that {t :
P2(t) ≤ γ} = {t :m∗2T (t) ≤ rγ}, M1T (P2(t) ≤ γ) =
M1T (m
∗
2T (t)≤ rγ), and Π2 is weakly informative at
level γ relative to Π1 if and only if M1T (m
∗
2T (t) ≤
rγ) ≤ γ. The fact that {rγ :γ ∈ [0,1]} ⊂ R implies
the last statement. 
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose first that Σ1 ≤
Σ2. We have that n
−1I + Σ1 ≤ n−1I + Σ2 and so
(n−1I+Σ1)
−1 ≥ (n−1I+Σ2)−1. This implies that (7)
is less than γ and so the Nk(µ0,Σ2) prior is uniform-
ly weakly informative relative to theNk(µ0,Σ1) prior.
For the converse put Vi = {y :y′(n−1I +Σi)−1y ≤
1}. If V1 ⊂ V2, then for y ∈Rk\{0} there exists c >
0 such that c2y′(n−1I + Σ1)
−1y = 1 which implies
cy ∈ V2 and so c2y′(n−1I+Σ2)−1y ≤ 1. This implies
that y′(n−1I + Σ1)
−1y ≥ y′(n−1I + Σ2)−1y and so
Σ1 ≤Σ2 and the result follows. If V2 ⊂ V1, then the
same reasoning says that Σ2 ≤Σ1 and (7) would be
greater than γ if Σ2 <Σ1.
So we need only consider the case where V1 ∩ V c2 ,
V c1 ∩ V2 both have positive volumes, that is, we are
supposing that neither Σ2−Σ1 nor Σ1 −Σ2 is pos-
itive semidefinite and then will obtain a contradic-
tion. Let δ = inf{y′(n−1I + Σ1)−1y :y ∈ V1 ∩ ∂V2}
and note that δ < 1, since V o1 ∩∂V2 6= φ, that is, there
are points in the interior of V1 on the boundary of V2.
Now put V0 = {y ∈ V1∩V c2 :y′(n−1I+Σ1)−1y ≤ (1+
δ)/2} and note that V0 has positive volume.
Let Y ∼ Nk(0, n−1I + Σ1) and τ2γ = G−1k (1 − γ).
ThenM1T (P1(t)≤γ)=P (Y ′(n−1I+Σ1)−1Y ≥ τ2γ ) =
P (Y /∈ τγV1) = 1−PY (τγ(V1∩V2)∪τγ(V1∩V c2 )) while
M1T (P2(t) ≤ γ) = P (Y ′(n−1I + Σ2)−1 · Y ≥ τ2γ ) =
P (Y /∈ τγV2) = 1 − PY (τγ(V1 ∩ V2) ∪ τγ(V c1 ∩ V2)).
Since γ =M1T (P1(t) ≤ γ), we need only show that
PY (τγ(V1 ∩ V c2 )) > PY (τγ(V c1 ∩ V2)) for all γ suffi-
ciently small, to establish the result.
Let f(x) = k1e
−x/2 be such that f(y′(n−1I +
Σ1)
−1y) is the density of Y . Then PY (τγ(V
c
1 ∩V2)) =∫
τγ (V c1 ∩V2)
f(y′(n−1I +Σ1)
−1y)dy ≤ f(τ2γy′∗(n−1I +
Σ1)
−1y∗)Vol((V
c
1 ∩ V2))τkγ where y∗ = argmin{y′ ·
(n−1I +Σ1)
−1y :y ∈ V c1 ∩ V2}. Note it is clear that
y∗ ∈ ∂V1 and so y′∗(n−1I +Σ1)−1y∗ = 1 and f(τ2γy′∗ ·
(n−1I+Σ1)
−1y∗) = k1e
−τ2γ/2. Also, PY (τγ(V1∩V c2 ))≥
PY (τγV0) =
∫
τγV0
f(y′(n−1I+Σ1)
−1y)dy ≥ f(τ2γ (1+
δ)/2)Vol(V0)τ
k
γ where f(τ
2
γ (1+δ)/2) = k1e
−τ2γ (1+δ)/4.
Therefore, as γ→ 0,
PY (τγ(V1 ∩ V c2 ))
PY (τγ(V c1 ∩ V2))
≥ eτ2γ (1−δ)/4Vol((V
c
1 ∩ V2))
Vol(V0)
→∞,
since τγ = (G
−1
k (1 − γ))1/2 →∞ as γ→ 0 and 0 <
δ < 1. 
Proof of Theorem 2. First note that we can
use (2) instead of (3) in this case as JT (x) is constant
in this case. We assume without loss of generality
that µ0 = 0.
We first establish several useful technical results.
If Πi is a probability distribution that is unimodal
and symmetric about 0, and φν denotes a N(0, ν)
density, we have that miT (t) =
∫
R φν(t − µ)Πi(dµ)
is unimodal and symmetric about 0. We have the
following result.
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Lemma A.1. If T is a minimal sufficient statistic,
JT (x) is constant in x, Π1 and Π2 are unimodal
and symmetric about 0, the Pi(t) have continuous
distributions when t ∼MiT ,m1T (0) > m2T (0), and
m1T (t) =m2T (t) has a unique solution for t > 0, then
Π2 is uniformly weakly informative relative to Π1.
Proof. By the unimodality and symmetry
of miT , we must have that Pi(t) =MiT (miT (u) ≤
miT (t)) =MiT (|u| ≥ |t|). We show M1T (|t| ≥ t0) ≤
M2T (|t| ≥ t0) for all t0 > 0 because it is equivalent
to Π2 being uniformly weakly informative relative
to Π1 by Lemma 1. Let ts be the solution ofm1T (t) =
m2T (t) on (0,∞). From the unique solution assump-
tion, m1T (t) > m2T (t) for t ∈ (0, ts) and m1T (t) <
m2T (t) for t > ts. For 0 ≤ t0 < ts,M1T (|t| ≥ t0) =
2
∫∞
t0
m1T (t)dt = 1 − 2
∫ t0
0 m1T (t)dt ≤ 1 −
2
∫ t0
0 m2T (t)dt= 2
∫∞
t0
m2T (t)dt=M2T (|t| ≥ t0) and
for t0 ≥ ts, M1T (|t| ≥ t0) = 2
∫∞
t0
m1T (t)dt ≤
2
∫∞
t0
m2T (t)dt,=M2T (|t|≥ t0). Thus, we are done. 
We can apply Lemma A.1 to comparing normal
and t priors when sampling from a normal.
Lemma A.2. Suppose we have a sample of n
from a location normal model, Π1 is a N(0, σ
2
1) prior
and Π2 is a t1(0, σ
2
2 , λ) prior. If m1T (0) >m2T (0),
then Π2 is uniformly weakly informative relative to Π1.
Proof. We have that m1T = φ1/n+σ21 and, us-
ing the representation of the t(λ) distribution as
a gamma mixture of normals, we write m2T (t) =∫∞
0 φ1/n+σ22/u(t)kλ(u)du where kλ is the density of
Gammarate(λ/2, λ/2) distribution. By the symme-
try of φv ,m2T is symmetric. Also, φv(t1)>φv(t2) for
0≤ t1<t2 and som2T (t1)=
∫
φ1/n+σ22/u(t1)kλ(u)du≥∫
φ1/n+σ22/u(t2)kλ(u)du=m2T (t2). Thus,m2T is de-
creasing on (0,∞), that is, m2T is unimodal. To
show that m2T (t) is log-convex with respect to t
2,
we prove that (d2/d(t2)2) logm2T (t)≥ 0. Note that
(d/d(t2))φv(t) = (d/d(t
2))[(2πv)−1/2 exp{−t2/2v}] =
−φv(t)/2v,
dm2T (t)
dt2
=−
∫ ∞
0
φ1/n+σ22/u(t)
2(1/n+ σ22/u)
kλ(u)du,
d2 logm2T (t)
d(t2)2
=
1
m2T (t)
∫ ∞
0
φ1/n+σ22/u(t)
[2(1/n+ σ22/u)]
2
kλ(u)du
− 1
m2T (t)2
(∫ ∞
0
φ1/n+σ22/u(t)
2(1/n+ σ22/u)
kλ(u)du
)2
and so d2 logm2T (t)/d(t
2)2 = VarV ([2(1/n +
σ22/V )]
−1)≥ 0, where V is the random variable hav-
ing density φ1/n+σ22/v(t)kλ(v)/m2T (t). Thus, m2T (t)
is log-convex in t2.
The functions m1T (t) and m2T (t) meet in at most
two points on (0,∞) because logm1T (t) is linear
in t2 and logm2T (t) is convex in t
2. Also, m1T (t)
and m2T (t) share at least one point on (0,∞) be-
cause m1T (0) > m2T (0), and the following shows
that m1T (t)<m2T (t) for all large t. Note first that
if u ≥ σ22/2σ21 , then (1/n + σ21)/(1/n + σ22/u) ≥ 1/2
and t2/(u/n+ σ22)≥ (2σ21/σ22)t2/(1/n+2σ21). Then,
m2T (t)
m1T (t)
≥
∫ ∞
σ22/2σ
2
1
(λ/2)λ/2
Γ(λ/2)
(2π(1/n+ σ22/u))
−1/2
(2π(1/n+ σ21))
−1/2
uλ/2−1
· exp{−(u/2)(λ+ t
2/(u/n+ σ22))}
exp{−(1/2)t2/(1/n+ σ21)}
du
≥ (λ/2)
λ/2
Γ(λ/2)
1
21/2
(
σ22
2σ21
)λ/2−1
·
∫ ∞
σ22/2σ
2
1
exp
{
−
(
u
2
)(
λ+
(2σ21/σ
2
2)t
2
1/n+2σ21
)}
·
(
exp
{ −(1/2)t2
(1/n+ σ21)
})−1
du
=
(λ/2)λ/2
Γ(λ/2)
1
21/2
·
(
σ22
2σ21
)λ/2−1
exp{−(1/2)(σ22/2σ21)λ}
· exp
{(
1
2
)
t2
((
1
n
+ σ21
)−1
−
(
1
n
+2σ21
)−1)}
·
{
2−1
(
λ+
(2σ21/σ
2
2)t
2
(1/n+2σ21)
)}−1
→∞
as t2→∞.
The above conditions together imply that m1T (t)
and m2T (t) meet in exactly one point on (0,∞).
Therefore, Π2 is uniformly weakly informative rela-
tive to Π1 by Lemma A.1. 
Since
∫∞
0 (1/n + σ
2/u)−1/2kλ(u)du is strictly de-
creasing in σ2, we see that m1T (0) = (2π(1/n +
σ21))
−1/2 ≥m2T (0) = (2π)−1/2
∫∞
0 (1/n+ σ
2
2/u)
−1/2 ·
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kλ(u)du is equivalent to σ2 ≥ σ0n where σ0n satis-
fies (1/n+σ21)
−1/2 =
∫∞
0 (1/n+σ
2
0n/u)
−1/2kλ(u)du.
This proves the first part of Theorem 2.
We also need the following results for the remain-
ing parts of Theorem 2.
Lemma A.3. ( i) σ20n/σ
2
1 increases as nσ
2
1 →∞,
( ii) σ20n/σ
2
1 → (2/λ)Γ2((λ + 1)/2)/Γ2(λ/2) as
nσ21 →∞.
Proof. (i) We have n−1/2(1/n + σ21)
−1/2 =
n−1/2
∫∞
0 (1/n+σ
2
0n/u)
−1/2kλ(u)du and putting α=
nσ21, β = nσ
2
0n, we can write this as
(1 +α)−1/2 =
∫ ∞
0
(1 + β/u)−1/2kλ(u)du.(A.1)
Differentiating both sides of (A.1) with respect to α,
we have (1 + α)−3/2 =
∫∞
0 (1 + β/
u)−3/2u−1kλ(u)du(dβ/dα). If we let U ∼
Gammarate(λ/2, λ/2), then this integral can be writ-
ten as the expectation
E((1 + β/U)−3/2U−1)
=E((1 + β/U)−3/2(β/U +1− 1)/β)
= β−1E((1 + β/U)−1/2)
− β−1E((1 + β/U)−3/2)
≤ β−1E((1 + β/U)−1/2)
− β−1{E((1 + β/U)−1/2)}3
= β−1(1 +α)−1/2 − β−1(1 +α)−3/2
= (1+ α)−3/2(α/β),
where the inequality follows via Jensen’s inequal-
ity. Hence, dβ/dα = (1 + α)−3/2[E((1 + β/U)−3/2 ·
U−1)]−1 ≥ β/α and so β/α is an increasing function
of α because d(β/α)/dα = α−1(dβ/dα)− β/α2 ≥ 0.
This proves σ20n/σ
2
1 = nσ
2
0n/nσ
2
1 = β/α increases as
α= nσ21 →∞.
(ii) It is easy to check that β = 0 when α= 0 and
β > 0 for α> 0. Let α0, β0 be a pair satisfying α0 > 0
and (A.1). Then, β/α ≥ β0/α0 > 0 for α > α0 and
β→∞ as α→∞. Therefore,
lim
α→∞
(
β
α
)1/2
= lim
α→∞
√
β√
1 + α
= lim
α→∞
E
( √
β√
1 + β/U
)
= lim
β→∞
E
( √
β√
1 + β/U
)
=E(
√
U)
=
∫ ∞
0
√
ukλ(u)du
= (2/λ)1/2Γ((λ+ 1)/2)/Γ(λ/2)
and this proves (ii). 
Lemma A.4. Suppose we have a sample of n
from a location normal model, Π1 is a N(0, σ
2
1) prior
and Π2 is a t1(0, σ
2
2 , λ) prior. Then Π2 is asymptot-
ically uniformly weakly informative relative to Π1 if
and only if σ22/σ
2
1 ≥ (2/λ)Γ2((λ+1)/2)/Γ2(λ/2).
Proof. Suppose that σ22/σ
2
1 ≥ (2/λ)Γ2((λ+1)/
2)/Γ2(λ/2). Then by Lemma A.3 σ22/σ
2
1 ≥ σ20n/σ21
for all n and so Π2 is uniformly weakly informa-
tive with respect to Π1 for all n. So (4) is bounded
above by γ for all n and so the limiting value of (4)
is also bounded above by γ. This establishes that Π2
is asymptotically uniformly weakly informative rel-
ative to Π1.
Suppose now that σ22/σ
2
1 < (2/λ)Γ
2((λ + 1)/2)/
Γ2(λ/2). Note that m1T (t) = limn→∞m1T,n(t) =
(2πσ21)
−1/2 exp(−t2/(2σ21)) and m2T (t) =
limn→∞m2T,n(t) = Γ((λ+1)/2)/(Γ(λ/2)
√
πλσ22)(1+
x2/(σ22λ))
−(λ+1)/2. Therefore, we get m1T (0) =
1/
√
2πσ21 < Γ((λ + 1)/2)/Γ(λ/2)
√
πλσ22 = m2T (0).
Let B = {t :m2T (t) > m1T (0)} and γ = M2T (Bc).
Then, m1T (t) ≤ m1T (0) ≤ m2T (t) on B and
M1T (P2(t) ≤ γ) = M1T (Bc) = 1 − M1T (B) = 1 −∫
Bm1T (t)dt≥ 1−
∫
Bm1T (0)dt≥ 1−
∫
Bm2T (t)dt=
M2T (B
c) = γ. Hence, Π2 is not weakly informative
relative to Π1 at level γ. Therefore, σ
2
2/σ
2
1 ≥ (2/
λ)Γ2((λ+1)/2)/Γ2(λ/2). 
It is now immediate that supγ∈[0,1]G
−1
1 (1 − γ)/
H−11,λ(1 − γ) = (2/λ)Γ2((λ + 1)/2)/Γ2(λ/2) and the
proof of Theorem 2 is complete. 
Proof of Theorem 3. Since the minimal suf-
ficient statistic T (x) = x¯ is linear, there is no volume
distortion and we can use (2) instead of (3). The lim-
iting prior predictive distribution of T (x) = x¯ under
Π1 is N(µ0,Σ1) and under Π2 it is tk(µ0,Σ2, λ). It
is easy to check that U1 = (T − µ0)′Σ−11 (T − µ0)∼
χ2(k) when T ∼Π1 and U2 = (T−µ0)′Σ−12 (T−µ0)∼
kFk,λ when T ∼Π2. This implies that P2,n(t0) con-
verges to P2(t0) = Π2(π2(t)≤ π2(t0)) = 1−Hk,λ((t0−
µ0)
′Σ−12 (t0 − µ0)/k), where Hk,λ is the distribution
function of an Fk,λ distribution. Further, we have
that (4) converges to Π1(P2(t)≤ γ).
Let Vi = {u ∈Rk :u′Σ−1i u < 1} for i= 1,2. By the
continuity of Π2(π2(t) ≤ r) as a function of r, and
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the continuity of π2(t), there exists t0 such that
P2(t) ≤ γ if and only if π2(t) ≤ π2(t0). Hence, Π2
is asymptotically uniformly weakly informative rela-
tive to Π1 if and only if Π1(π2(t) ≤ π2(t0)) ≤
Π2(π2(t)≤ π2(t0)) for all t0 ∈Rk by Lemma 1. Since
π2(t) is decreasing in u2 = U2(t), the set {π2(t) ≤
π2(t0)} = {u2(t) ≥ u2(t0)} = µ0 + u2(t0)V c2 . So we
must prove that Π1(µ0+ r
1/2V c2 )≤Π2(µ0+ r1/2V c2 )
for all r ≥ 0.
The positive semidefiniteness of Σ2−τ2λΣ1 implies
that Σ−11 /τ
2
λ − Σ−12 is positive semidefinite. Then,
for u ∈ V c2 , that is, u′Σ−12 u ≥ 1, we have u′Σ−11 u=
τ2λ ·u′(Σ−11 /τ2λ)u≥ τ2λu′Σ−12 u≥ τ2λ . Thus, V c2 ⊂ τλV c1 .
Now we prove a stronger inequality Π1(µ0 +
r1/2τλ · V c1 ) ≤ Π2(µ0 + r1/2V c2 ) for all r ≥ 0. Note
that
Π1(µ0 + r
1/2τλV
c
1 )
= Π1(u1(t)≥ rτ2λ)
=
∫ ∞
rτ2
λ
2−k/2
Γ(k/2)
uk/2−1e−u/2 du,
Π2(µ0 + r
1/2V c2 )
= Π2(u2(t)≥ r)
=
∫ ∞
r/k
Γ((k+ λ)/2)
Γ(k/2)Γ(λ/2)
·
(
k
λ
)k/2
uk/2−1
(
1 +
ku
λ
)−(k+λ)/2
du,
and set f(r) = Π2(µ0 + r
1/2V c2 ) − Π1(µ0 + r1/2τλ ·
V c1 ). Then, f(0) = 0 and
df(r)
dr
=
2−k/2
Γ(k/2)
(rτ2λ)
k/2−1e−rτ
2
λ
/2τ2λ
· Γ((k+ λ)/2)
Γ(k/2)Γ(λ/2)
(
k
λ
)k/2( r
k
)k/2−1
· (1 + r/λ)−(k+λ)/2 1
k
=
(τ2λ/2)
k/2
Γ(k/2)
rk/2−1e−rτ
2
λ
/2
− Γ((k + λ)/2)
Γ(k/2)Γ(λ/2)
λ−k/2rk/2−1
· (1 + r/λ)−(k+λ)/2
= p1− p2.
Note that p1−p2 ≥ 0 is equivalent to p1/p2 ≥ 1. Fur-
ther recalling the definition of τ2λ from the statement
of the theorem,
p1
p2
=
τkλΓ(λ/2)
Γ((k + λ)/2)
(
λ
2
)k/2
(1 + r/λ)(k+λ)/2
· exp(−rτ2λ/2)
= (1 + r/λ)(k+λ)/2 exp(−rτ2λ/2)≥ 1.
The logarithm of p1/p2 given by log(p1/p2) =−rτ2λ/
2+ ((k+ λ)/2) log(1+ r/λ) is concave as a function
of r > 0. Hence, log(p1/p2) = 0 has exactly two solu-
tions: r= 0 and r= rs. Because of its concavity, the
function log(p1/p2) is positive on (0, rs) and nega-
tive on (rs,∞). This implies that f(r) is increasing
on (0, rs) and decreasing on (rs,∞). Since f(0) = 0
and limr→∞ f(r) = 0, the function f is nonnega-
tive, that is, f(r) ≥ 0 for all r ≥ 0. Thus, Π1(µ0 +
r1/2V c2 ) ≤ Π1(µ0 + r1/2τλV c1 ) ≤ Π2(µ0 + r1/2V c2 ) for
all r≥ 0. 
Proof of Theorem 4. Let x−1c = β1/(α1 +
1/2) = β2/(α2 + 1/2). For i = 1,2, let ti(t0) = 1/
(xcri(t0)) be the two solutions of m
∗
2T (ti) =m
∗
2T (t0)
(one of the ti equals t0) so 0< r1 ≤ 1≤ r2. Note that
r2(t0) = 1 if and only if t0 = x
−1
c and then r1(t0) = 1
as well. Then, log(r1/r2) = r1 − r2 and dr1/dr2 =
(r2−1)r1/[(r1−1)r2]. Now {t :m∗2T (t)≤m∗2T (t0)}=
{t : 1/t ≤ xcr1(t0) or 1/t ≥ xcr2(t0)}. By Lemma 1
we have that uniform weak informativity is equiv-
alent to M1T (m
∗
2T (t) ≤ m∗2T (t0)) ≤ M2T (m∗2T (t) ≤
m∗2T (t0)) for all t0 and so we must prove thatM1T (t /∈
(t2(t0), t1(t0))) = M1T (1/t ≤ xcr1(t0) or 1/t ≥
xcr2(t0)) = 1−M1T (xcr1(t0)≤ 1/t≤ xcr2(t0))≤ 1−
M2T (xcr1(t0)≤ 1/t≤ xcr2(t0)) for all t0. Since r1 is
implicitly a function of r2, it is equivalent to prove
that M1T (xcr1 ≤ 1/t ≤ xcr2) − M2T (xcr1 ≤
1/t ≤ xcr2) ≥ 0 for all r2 ≥ 1. Using (r1/r2)α =
exp(α(r1 − r2)), we have that the derivatives of the
two terms are given by
p1 =
d
dr2
∫ xcr2
xcr1
c1u
α1−1e−β1u du
= c1(xcr2)
α1−1e−β1xcr2xc
− c1(xcr1)α1−1e−β1xcr1xcdr1
dr2
= c1x
α1
c r
α1−1
2 e
−β1xcr2
·
(
1− r2 − 1
r1 − 1 exp((r2 − r1)(β1xc − α1))
)
,
p2 = c2x
α2
c r
α2−1
2 e
−β2xcr2
·
(
1− r2 − 1
r1 − 1 exp((r2 − r1)(β2xc − α2))
)
,
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where ci = β
αi
i /Γ(αi). Then, recalling the definition
of xc, we have that the ratio p1/p2 = (c1/c2)x
α1−α2
c ·
rα1−α22 e
(β2−β1)xcr2 = (c1/c2)x
α1−α2
c (r2e
−r2)α1−α2
strictly decreases as r2 increases from 1 to ∞ when
α1 > α2 because α1 − α2 = (β1 − β2)xc ≥ 0, and is
identically 1 when α1 = α2. Suppose then that α1 >
α2 so there is at most one r2 value where p1 = p2
and the derivative is 0. If (p1/p2)|r2=1 < 1, then p1−
p2 < 0 for all r2 ≥ 1 and M1T (xcr1 ≤ 1/t ≤ xcr2)−
M2T (xcr1 ≤ 1/t ≤ xcr2) strictly decreases from 0.
This cannot hold because M1T (xcr1 ≤ 1/t≤ xcr2)−
M2T (xcr1 ≤ 1/t≤ xcr2)→ 0 as r2→∞. Hence, (p1/
p2)|r2=1 ≥ 1 and M1T (xcr1 ≤ 1/t ≤ xcr2) −
M2T (xcr1 ≤ 1/t≤ xcr2) increases from 0 near r2 = 1
and decreases to 0 as r2→∞. Therefore,M1T (xcr1 ≤
1/t ≤ xcr2)−M2T (xcr1 ≤ 1/t ≤ xcr2) goes up from
0 and down to 0 as r2 increases from 1 to ∞, and
we haveM1T (xcr1 ≤ 1/t≤ xcr2)−M2T (xcr1 ≤ 1/t≤
xcr2)≥ 0 for all r2 ≥ 1. 
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